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^competitive and regulatory pressures
have prompted banks and other financial
intermediaries to participate in credit mar-
kets in ways that are not directly reflected
on their balance sheets. This poses a prob-
lem for regulators, who must assess the
risks of these off-balance-sheet lending
activities. One such activity is the packag-
ing of loans into marketable securities,
which is known as asset-backed lending or
securitization.
For example, banks and other loan
originators often sell fixed-rate
mortgages to government-sponsored
agencies, which in turn package these
loans with those acquired from other in-
stitutions into mortgage pools. The
agency sells securities that are claims
to these pools to investors in the bond
market. In the past several years,
securitization has spread beyond
government-sponsored activity to
private asset-backed pools that fund a
wide range of loans.
The recent proliferation of asset-backed
lending has raised questions about its im-
pact on the performance of banks. This
concern reflects the fact that banks are in-
volved in many aspects of the securitiza-
tion process, such as packaging, servic-
ing, or enhancing the creditworthiness of
these securities. Regulators must deter-
mine what risks securitization poses to the
participating institutions and how these
risks should be reflected in the assessment
of bank capital requirements.
This Economic Commentary explores
banks' incentives to engage in securiti-
zation. Part of the dramatic increase in
this activity can be traced to banking
regulations that raise the cost of fund-
ing loans with deposits. However,
another important factor driving asset-
backed lending by banks is the im-
provement in information technology
that has made securitization cost effec-
tive. Indeed, the proliferation of asset-
backed lending to nonbank firms indi-
cates that this mode of funding has
become efficient for firms not subject
to these regulatory costs.
From this perspective, we contend that
securitization itself is not undesirable,
and in fact is an efficient response by
banks to their changing financial en-
vironment. Securitization serves as a
vehicle for institutions to mitigate both
credit and interest-rate risks, while
generating fee income for participating
banks. Moreover, the securitization
process enables banks to attract inves-
tors who would otherwise not hold
bank liabilities. Nevertheless, securiti-
zation poses a challenge to regulators,
as they must assess how this activity af-
fects risk in the banking industry.
• Securitization and Diversification
As their name suggests, depository in-
stitutions, such as commercial banks
and savings and loans (thrifts), have
traditionally funded their lending ac-
tivities by attracting deposits. How-
ever, until 1986, deposit-rate ceilings
The recent surge in the volume of
asset-backed lending has prompted
regulators to scrutinize its effects on the
banking industry. Although popular
wisdom holds that securitization has
been regulatory driven, much of the
boom in this funding process has been
the result of improvements in informa-
tion technology, which have made
securitization highly cost effective for
banks and nonbanks alike.
limited the ability of these institutions
to attract funds when market rates rose
above regulated maximums. Banks and
thrifts also tended to operate in fairly
localized markets because of informa-
tion costs and regulations limiting the
scale and scope of banking activities.
Depositories were therefore vulnerable
to local credit-market conditions, such
as the health of the local real-estate
market. This was particularly true of
thrifts, which were required to hold a
certain fraction of their portfolios as
residential mortgages.
Indeed, asset-backed lending began as
an outgrowth of the government's
effort to increase the flow of funds to
the mortgage market. In the late 1960s,
government-sponsored credit agencies
such as the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) and the
Government National Mortgage Asso-
ciation (Ginnie Mae) were established
to create a secondary market in which
ISSN 0428-1276existing mortgages could be sold.
These agencies operated as intermedi-
aries, buying government-guaranteed
mortgages and funding these acquisi-
tions by issuing securities. In 1970,
Ginnie Mae issued a new type of credit-
market instrument: the mortgage "pass-
through," which was a claim to the
return on a specified pool of mortgages.
Hence, securitization was bom.
Today, the asset-backed market is a via-
ble entity in its own right Pools of
securitized mortgages currently fund
nearly 40 percent of home mortgages
outstanding (see figure 1). Although
government-sponsored mortgage-backed
securities account for the largest share
of this market, the past decade has wit-
nessed the growth of securitization by
private firms packaging mortgages as
well as other loans such as credit-card
and auto receivables. Depository insti-
tutions and nonbank firms are now able
to originate and sell a wide variety of
loans to asset-backed pools, rather than
funding them on their balance sheets.
Asset pooling increases the liquidity of
the underlying loans to the point where
they can be sold to investors who are
willing to hold direct claims on a diver-
sified portfolio (see box). Because
these claims increase the diversification
and liquidity of loan portfolios, the as-
sociated securities are often bought by
banks as well as by other investors.
Securitization allows banks to avoid the
risks associated with deposit funding.
When depository institutions fund loans
with deposits, the liabilities they are issu-
ing (deposits) have very different charac-
teristics from the assets they are acquir-
ing (loans). Individual loans, such as
mortgages, are illiquid: They have a rela-
tively long term to maturity and are gen-
erally not individually marketable to in-
vestors. Alternatively, deposit liabilities,
such as checking and savings accounts,
are short-term, liquid assets.
The differences in the maturity of banks'
assets and liabilities cause depository in-
stitutions to be vulnerable to interest-rate
risk. When interest rates rise, banks must
pay higher deposit rates while being
effectively locked into the return on
their existing portfolios. An unex-
pected increase in interest rates will
therefore reduce their net income. This
risk is asymmetric, however: When in-
terest rates drop unexpectedly, banks
do not gain by an equal amount. In this
case, banks are not as locked into the
return on their loan portfolios, because
borrowers can often refinance their
terms of credit.
Securitization in effect allows deposi-
tory institutions to mitigate both the
credit risks and the funding risks asso-
ciated with lending, especially in the
case of fixed-rate mortgages.
3 Indeed,
an increasingly large number of home
mortgages are being earmarked for sale
into mortgage pools (see figure 1).
• Regulatory Motives
for Asset Securitization
Although securitization can help banks to
manage both credit risk and interest-rate
risk, the recent surge in asset-backed
lending has been more commonly attrib-
uted to the regulatory costs of traditional
bank funding.
Capital requirements, which stipulate
that depository institutions must back a
certain fraction of their loans with equi-
ty capital, are an important regulatory
incentive for securitization. Because
they increase the amount of losses that
equity holders can bear, capital require-
ments tend to reduce the risk of bank
failure. Alternatively, nonbank lenders
(such as finance companies) are not
subject to regulated capital require-
ments. Instead, they evaluate the in-
herent risk of borrowers to determine
the terms at which they are willing to
extend credit.
The growth in asset-backed lending by
banks can therefore be viewed as a
response to increased competition from
nonbank lenders. If the regulatory capi-
tal requirement on a particular class of
loans is greater than merited by the in-
herent risk of the claims, then in order
to compete with nonbank lenders,
banks must securitize these loans—that
is, move them off their balance sheets,
where they are not subject to capital
CREDIT ENHANCEMENT
OF ASSET-BACKED POOLS
The growth of asset-backed lend*
ing other man government-hacked
mortgages raises the question of
how securitization is able to mar-
ket Illiquid loans. Asset securiti-
zation involves the issuance of
private-rated (asset-backed) se-
Guntfes as, c&ims against a poof
of assets held in a bust, fo addi -
• tkm to relying on cash flow* of
the; underlying assets to pay in-
asset-backed pools is enhanced
many of is«yeral ways. :
Ota such enhancement i»a bank
standby feue* of sifcjit (SLO.
isstte art S J.C. in which they
p^rty ur/ta'a pjfespecirfed amount
fij» any tosses incurred on the
secbritizing loans.'However, be-
fore loans are securitize*!, both
the foams and the bank issuing
the: SLC are rate4 Because th$
r^tirtg of a pool can be affected
b^i the rating of the bank guaran-
l&eiflg the loajas, this form of en-
hancement: has become some-
what less widespread.
An increasingly popular, enhance-
ment, the cash-collateral-account
method, has die borrowers cover-
ing potential tosses with cash
placed in an escrow account
1
Another method is for these
securities to be overcollateral-
ized, That is, extra loans are
added to the pobls so that the
value of the loans exceeds the
value of the securities that are
claims to the pool.
a. See Suzanne Wittebort, "Asset-
Backeds Come of Age," Institutional
Investor, December 1991, pp. 77-80.FIGURE 1 HOME MORTGAGES HELD BY MORTGAGE POOLS
VS. COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THRIFTS
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NOTE: All data are for the fourth quarter. The two categories do not add to 100 percent because other institu-
tions, such as finance companies, also hold home mortgages.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
requirements. An unavoidable conse-
quence, however, is that the loans
which remain on bank balance sheets
are likely to be those for which the
market's assessment of risk premiums
is greater than the regulated assessment.
Two other regulatory taxes that have
been cited as potential inducements for
asset-backed lending by depository in-
stitutions are fractional reserve require-
ments and flat-rate FDIC insurance
premiums on deposit liabilities. These
assessments are viewed as raising the
cost of deposit funding, thus encourag-
ing depository institutions to fund loans
off-balance-sheet. However, securitiza-
tion has continued to expand in spite of
decreases in the reserve requirements
set by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. In addition,
deposit insurance is subsidized to the
extent that flat-rate deposit insurance
premiums are unlikely to be a major
factor in the growth of securitization.
But, since deposit insurance premiums
are currently not risk based, they may
still have the undesirable effect of caus-
ing banks to securitize their safest and
most liquid loans.
It has also been argued that deposit in-
surance may increase the incentive for
banks to issue standby letters of credit
(SLCs) to enhance securitized loans,
because SLCs are senior claims in the
event of bank failure (see box).
4 This
incentive to shift risk to the FDIC,
however, may not be too important. Be-
cause the creditworthiness of both die
loans being securitized and the bank issu-
ing the credit-enhancing SLC affects the
credit rating of the pool, banks that issue
SLCs are generally lower-risk institu-
tions. Thus, it is doubtful that the cur-
rent deposit insurance scheme is a major
reason why banks issue SLCs, because
the seniority of claims is important only
in the event of bank failure.
• Securitization
and Loan Financing
While regulatory costs and portfolio
risks associated with deposit funding
may help to explain asset-backed lend-
ing by banks, the increase in securitiza-
tion by nonbank. firms is evidence that
this financing method has become a vi-
able alternative to other sources of credit
—including bank finance. Indeed, non-
bank securitization is just one example of
the growing competition banks face from
nonbank suppliers of credit.
A prominent factor underlying the evolu-
tion of the financial sector, especially that
of asset-backed securities markets, has
been the improvement in technology for
producing information. This has enabled
firms to transfer information about indi-
vidual accounts, making securitization
much more cost effective.
These innovations provide another im-
portant rationale for the growth of
securitization, since asset-backed lend-
ing may reduce the costs associated
with monitoring certain types of credit.
The basic intuition is as follows. The
cost of funding a portfolio is related to
the costs of monitoring its performance.
By issuing asset-backed securities
through a separate subsidiary (called a
special-purpose vehicle), a firm can
separate these claims from other claims
on its balance sheet. Investors, there-
fore, need assess only the performance
of the asset pool rather than the general
creditworthiness of the borrowing firm.
If the assessment of the pool is less
costly to monitor than that of the entire
firm, the ability to separate these
claims from the remainder of the firm's
balance sheet enables the firm to obtain
better credit terms on the pool.
For example, when Macy's extends con-
sumer installment credit to its customers,
it obtains credit-card receivables that it
must finance. If the store funds these
receivables on its overall balance sheet,
the funding costs will reflect Macy's
general creditworthiness. Alternatively, if
Macy's securitizes its credit-card receiv-
ables through a special-purpose vehicle,
it may be able to obtain lower financing
costs, as the credit quality of these receiv-
ables alone may be less costly to assess.
• Conclusion
The proliferation of asset-backed lending
is merely one indication of how the finan-
cial scene is changing. As evidenced by
the involvement of nonbanks in this mar-
ket, securitization is clearly more than an
artifact of banking regulations. Although
off-balance-sheet lending by depository
institutions may be more efficient than
traditional bank intermediation for some
types of loans, these activities may also
impact the risk of banks' balance sheets.
Because of the potential for increased
FDIC exposure to bank failures, policy-
makers are understandably concerned
about the rapid growth of this practice.In its role as an insurer, the government
aims to maintain the solvency of the in-
surance fund by setting deposit insurance
premiums and capital requirements.
But it is precisely these assessments
that can affect the risks undertaken by
depository institutions. Such regulatory
taxes create incentives for banks to
shrink their balance sheets through
securitization.
Unfortunately, when regulated capital re-
quirements and deposit insurance pre-
miums do not reflect the riskiness of a
bank's portfolio, they create the incentive
for banks to securitize their safest loans
and to hold the riskier ones. Thus, risk is
shifted to the FDIC (and ultimately to tax-
payers). Regulatory changes that more
accurately price an institution's risk will
tend to diminish the adverse incentives
for bank asset securitization.
The risk-based capital guidelines cur-
rently being implemented, as well as
the risk-based deposit insurance pre-
miums recently legislated by Congress,
are attempts to link regulatory costs to
an institution's risk. Risk-based capital
standards will be phased in by year-
end. Banks will then be charged dif-
ferent deposit insurance premiums
depending on the overall quality of
their asset portfolios.
Because the new risk-based guidelines
stipulate higher capital requirements on
all bank loans other than home mort-
gages, they may actually increase the
volume of securitization. However, the
trend toward asset-backed lending is not
entirely adverse for the FDIC. Depository
institutions can earn fee income for par-
ticipating in various dimensions of the
securitization process, such as by en-
hancing asset-backed pools. Moreover,
with appropriate regulatory supervision of
banks' off-balance-sheet activities, asset-
backed lending can mitigate the rising
costs of the federal safety net as it reduces
the share of credit funded on the balance
sheets of depository institutions. Thus,
securitization is better viewed as an impor-
tant innovation in the financial sector—
one that allows new suppliers of credit to
enter the market and existing ones to inter-
mediate credit more efficiently.
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1. See Christine Pavel, "Securitization,"
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also helped to reduce the dangers of interest-
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decade, and the subsequent sharp drop in
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banks. This volatility was further aggravated by
interest-rate ceilings, such as Regulation Q.
4. Current banking regulations do not allow
a bank to issue any claims senior to those of
the FDIC: When a bank fails, no individual
or institution can receive its funds ahead of
the federal insurance agency. However, the
SLCs used as credit enhancements in effect
give asset-backed security holders a senior
claim on the bank's assets, thus maximizing
the subsidy that banks receive from deposit
insurance. See Lawrence M. Benveniste and
Allen N. Berger, "Securitization with Re-
course: An Instrument that Offers Uninsured
Bank Depositors Sequential Claims," Jour-
nal of Banking and Finance, vol. 11, no. 3
(September 1987), pp. 403-24.
5. See Robert B.Avery and Allen N. Berger,
"Loan Commitments and Bank Risk Expo-
sure," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Working Paper 9015, December 1990.
6. See Howard W. Albert, "Asset Securitiza-
tion: Benefits for All Banks," The Bankers
Magazine, vol. 174, no. 6 (November/
December 1991), pp. 16-20.
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